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Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This essay dis-
cusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the neuroeconomic critique
of standard economics.
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Neuroeconomics proposes radical changes in the methods of economics. This essay dis-
cusses the proposed changes in methodology, together with the the neuroeconomic critique
of standard economics. Our deﬁnition of neuroeconomics includes research that makes no
speciﬁc reference to neuroscience and is traditionally referred to as psychology and eco-
nomics. We identify neuroeconomics as research that implicitly or explicitly makes the
following two claims:
Assertion I: Psychological and physiological evidence (such as descriptions of hedonic
states and brain processes) are directly relevant to economic theories. In particular, they
can be used to support or reject economic models or even economic methodology.
Assertion II: What makes individuals happy (‘true utility’) diﬀers from what they
choose. Economic welfare analysis should use true utility rather than the utilities governing
choice (‘choice utility’).
Neuroeconomics goes beyond the common practice of economists to use psychological
insights as inspiration for economic modeling or to take into account experimental evidence
that challenges behavioral assumptions of economic models. Neuroeconomics appeals di-
r e c t l yt ot h en e u r o s c i e n c ee v i d e n c et or e j e c ts t a n d a r de c o n o m i cm o d e l so rt oq u e s t i o n
economic constructs.
Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (2005) (henceforth CLP (2005)) express the neu-
roeconomics critique with explicit reference to brain-imaging studies:
“Many of the processes that occur in these systems are aﬀective rather than cognitive;
they are directly concerned with motivation. This might not matter for economics were
it not for the principles that guide the aﬀective system — the way that it operates — is
so much at variance with the standard economics account of behavior.” (CLP (2005)
p. 25-26).
Hence, the authors assert that brain-imaging evidence shows that the aﬀective system plays
a central role in many decisions and that the aﬀective system is at odds with standard
economic models.
1In this essay, we argue that Assertion I of the neuroeconomic critique misunderstands
economic methodology and underestimates the ﬂexibility of standard models. Economics
and psychology address diﬀerent questions, utilize diﬀerent abstractions, and address dif-
ferent types of empirical evidence. Neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models
because the latter make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of
the brain. Conversely, brain science cannot revolutionize economics because the latter has
no vehicle for addressing the concerns of economics. We also argue that the methods of
standard economics are much more ﬂexible than it is assumed in the neuroeconomics cri-
tique and illustrate this with examples of how standard economics deals with inconsistent
preferences, mistakes, and biases.
N e u r o e c o n o m i s t si m p o r tt h eq u e s t i o n sa n da b stractions of psychology and re-interpret
economic models as if their purpose were to address those questions. The standard eco-
nomic model of choice is treated as a model of the brain and found to be inadequate. Either
economics is treated as amateur brain science and rejected as such or brain evidence is
treated as economic evidence to reject economic models.
Kahneman (1994) asserts that subjecti v es t a t e sa n dh e d o n i cu t i l i t ya r e“legitimate
topics of study”. This may be true, but such states and utilities are not useful for calibrating
and testing standard economic models. Discussions of hedonic experiences play no role in
standard economic analysis because economics makes no predictions about them and has no
data to test such prediction. Economists also lack the means for integrating measurement
of hedonic utility with standard economic data. Therefore, they have found it useful to
conﬁne themselves to the analysis of the latter.
The neuroeconomics program for change in economics ignores the fact that economists,
even when dealing with questions related to those studied in psychology, have diﬀerent
objectives and address diﬀerent empirical evidence. These fundamental diﬀerences are
obscured by the tendency of neuroeconomists to describe both disciplines in very broad
terms.
“Because psychology systematically explores human judgement, behavior, well-being
it can teach us important facts about how human diﬀer from the way traditionally
described by economics,” (Rabin (1998)).
2Note the presumption that across disciplines there is a single set of constructs (or facts) for
describing how humans are. Rabin omits that economics and psychology study diﬀerent
kinds of behavior and, more importantly, focus on diﬀerent variables that inﬂuence behav-
ior. Realistic assumptions and useful abstractions when relating visceral cues to behavior
may be less realistic or useful when relating behavior to market variables. Consider the
following two statements:
“Much aversion to risks is driven by immediate fear responses, which are largely trace-
able to a small area of the brain called the amygdala;”(Camerer, Loewenstein and
Prelec (2004), p. 567 (henceforth CLP (2004)).
“A decision-maker is (globally) risk averse, [...] if and only if his von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility is concave at the relevant (all) wealth levels.” Ingersoll (1987).
Which of these statements is (more) true? Which provides a better understanding of
risk aversion? Most researchers recognize the various terms in the second statement as
abstractions belonging to the specialized vocabulary of economics. Though less apparent,
the language of the ﬁrst statement is equally specialized in its use of discipline-speciﬁc
abstractions. The terms ‘immediate fear,’ ‘traceable,’ ‘risk averse behavior,’ and even
‘amygdala’1 are abstractions of neuroscience and psychology. Note that the term ‘risk
aversion’ represents ad i ﬀerent abstraction in the two statements above. For Ingersoll, risk
aversion is an attitude towards monetary gambles. For CLP (2004), risk aversion seems
to be a much broader term that is readily applied to decisions involving plane travel. It
m a k e sl i t t l es e n s et oi n s i s tt h a tt h ee c o n o m i cn o t i o no fr i s ka v e r s i o ni sf a l s ew h i l et h e
psychological notion is true.
Assertion (II) of the neuroeconomic critique misunderstands the role of welfare anal-
ysis in economics. Standard economics identiﬁes welfare with choice, i.e., a change (in
consumption) is deﬁned to be welfare improving if and only if, given the opportunity, the
individual would choose to make that change. The neuroeconomic critique of standard
welfare analysis mistakes the economic deﬁnition of welfare for a theory of happiness and
1 To see that even the term amygdala is not self-evident, consider the task of identifying a part of the
rat brain as being the same as a corresponding part of the human brain.
3proceeds to ﬁnd evidence against that theory. The standard deﬁnition of welfare is appro-
priate because standard economics has no therapeutic ambition; it does not try to improve
the decision-maker but tries to evaluate how economic institutions mediate (perhaps psy-
chologically unhealthy) behavior of agents.
Standard welfare economics functions as a part of positive economics. It provides a
benchmark for the performance of economic institutions at aggregating individual prefer-
ences. Economists use welfare analysis to explain the persistence of some (eﬃcient) insti-
tutions or to identify problems and anomalies in models of other (ineﬃcient) institutions.
For example, observing that an existing institution leads to Pareto eﬃcient outcomes may
increase the researcher’s conﬁdence in his model, while noting that the institution leads
to Pareto ineﬃciency may lead researchers to seek explanations for the persistence of that
institution. Within this conception of welfare economics, what is relevant are the agents’
interests (or preferences) as perceived by the agents themselves. An institution’s eﬀective-
ness at maximizing the true happiness of its participants cannot justify the persistence of
that institution if the criterion for true happiness conﬂicts with the participants’ revealed
preferences. After all, only the latter plays a role in behavior.
Neuroeconomists expect recent developments in psychology and brain science to yield
answers to age-old philosophical questions such as “what is happiness?”; “should we be
willing to take actions contrary to a person’s wishes if we happen to know that such actions
will make them happier?” a n di n s i s to nan e wn o t i o no fw e l f a r eb a s e do nt h e s ea n s w e r s .
Perhaps a therapist or a medical professional is guided by his answers to the two ques-
tions above; he may fashion his advice to advance the perceived objectives of the patient
or to increase the patient’s true happiness, as deﬁned by the therapist himself.2 Neu-
roeconomic welfare analysis assumes a relationship between the economist and economic
agents similar to the therapist-patient relationship. Normative economics is therefore iden-
tiﬁed with eﬀective therapy. The economist/therapist can inﬂuence individuals’ happiness
by dispensing compelling advice or by inﬂuencing the decisions of powerful (and perhaps
paternalistic) intermediaries. For example, Kahneman (1994) suggests that there is
2 This description might over-state the therapist discretion. Either a professional code or market forces
may limit the extent to which he can pursue the patient’s true happiness. Hence, the two philosophical
questions above may or may not have some relevance to the therapist. Our contention is that they have
none for economists.
4“...a case in favour of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that
the state knows more about an individual’s future tastes than the individual knows
presently.”
Hence, the goal of welfare economics and perhaps the goal of all economics is to aﬀect
changes that result in greater happiness to all. In this endeavor neuroeconomists plan to
enlist the support of the state — a stand-in for a benign therapist — who may, on occasion,
conceal facts and make decisions on behalf of the individual’s future selves.
Neuroeconomists seek a welfare criterion that is appropriate for an economist who is
part social scientist and part advocate/therapist; someone who not only analyzes economic
phenomena but also plays a role in shaping them. Neuroeconomists assert that the stan-
dard economic welfare criterion is not adequate for this task. Our response to this criticism
is simple: the standard welfare criterion is not intended to facilitate advocacy for therapeu-
tic interventions. The standard approach assumes a separation between the economist’s
r o l ea ss o c i a ls c i e n t i s ta n dt h er o l et h a ts o m ee c o n o m i s t sm a yp l a ya sa d v i s o r so ra d v o c a t e s .
This separation is valuable because it enables economists to analyze and compare diﬀerent
institutions without having to agree on the answers to diﬃcult philosophical questions.
I nt h en e x ts e c t i o n ,w ed e ﬁne the standard approach (or standard economics) and the
neuroeconomics approach. In section 3, we discuss how the diﬀerent goals of psychology
and of economics necessitate diﬀerent abstractions. As an example, we contrast the eco-
nomic concepts of “complements” and “externalities” with the psychological concept of a
“cue.” In section 4, we present an example of each approach to illustrate our classiﬁca-
tion and highlight the diﬀerences in the concerns and abstractions of standard economics
and neuroeconomics. In sections 5, 6, and 7 we discuss the three main arguments of the
neuroeconomics critique. Section 8 contains our closing remarks.
52. The Two Approaches: Deﬁnitions and Objectives
2.1 Standard Economics
The standard approach to behavioral economics extends standard choice theoretic
methods to analyze variables that are often ignored. Some of these extensions are modest
and entail little more than specifying a richer set of preferences over the same economic
consequences. Others necessitate novel descriptions of the relevant economic outcomes.
Yet, in most cases, the subsequent analysis is very similar to what can be found in a
standard graduate textbook.
In the standard approach, the term utility maximization and choice are synonymous.
A utility function is always an ordinal index that describes how the individual ranks
various outcomes and how he behaves (chooses) given his constraints (available options).
The relevant data are revealed preference data; that is, consumption choices given the
individual’s constraints. These data are used to calibrate the model (i.e., to identify
the particular parameters) and the resulting calibrated models are used to predict future
choices and perhaps equilibrium variables such as prices. Hence, standard (positive) theory
identiﬁes choice parameters from past behavior and relates these parameters to future
behavior and equilibrium variables.
Standard economics focuses on revealed preference because economic data come in
t h i sf o r m . E c o n o m i cd a t ac a n—a tb e s t—r e v e a lw h a tt h ea g e n tw a n t s( o rh a sc h o s e n )
in a particular situation. Such data do not enable the economist to distinguish between
what the agent intended to choose and what he ended up choosing; what he chose and
what he ought to have chosen. The standard approach provides no methods for utilizing
non-choice data to calibrate preference parameters. The individual’s coeﬃcient of risk
aversion, for example, cannot be identiﬁed through a physiological examination; it can
only be revealed through choice behavior. If an economist proposes a new theory based on
non-choice evidence then either the new theory leads to novel behavioral predictions, in
which case it can be tested with revealed preference evidence, or it does not, in which case
the modiﬁcation is vacuous. In standard economics, the testable implications of a theory
are its content; once they are identiﬁed, the non-choice evidence that motivated a novel
theory becomes irrelevant.
6As its welfare criterion, standard economics uses the individuals’ choice behavior, that
is, revealed preferences. Alternative x is deemed to be better than alternative y if and only
if, given the opportunity, the individual would choose x over y.3 Hence, welfare is deﬁned
to be synonymous with choice behavior.
In standard economics, an individual’s decisions may improve when a constraint is
relaxed. For example, an agent may make better decisions if he is given better information,
more resources, or more time to make his decision. However, standard economics has no
therapeutic ambition, i.e., it does not try to evaluate or improve the individual’s objectives.
Economics cannot distinguish between choices that maximize happiness, choices that reﬂect
a sense of duty, or choices that are the response to some impulse. Moreover, standard
economics takes no position on the question of which of those objectives the agent should
pursue.
The purpose of economics is to analyze institutions, such as trading mechanisms and
organization structures, and to ask how those institutions mediate the interests of dif-
f e r e n te c o n o m i ca g e n t s . T h i sa n a l y s i si su s e ful irrespective of the causes of individuals’
preferences. Standard economics ignores the therapeutic potential of economic policies
and leaves it to therapists, medical professionals, and ﬁnancial advisors to help individuals
reﬁne their goals.
2.2 Neuroeconomics
“‘This new approach, which I consider a revolution, should provide a theory of how
people decide in economic and strategic situations,’ said Dr. Aldo Rustichini, an
economics professor at the University of Minnesota. ‘So far, the decision process has
been for economists a black box.’” 4
Later, in the same article, the author explains that
“In a study published in the current issue of the journal Science, Dr. Cohen and his
c o l l e a g u e s ,i n c l u d i n gD r .A l a nG .S a n f e yo fP r i n c e t o n ,t o o ki m a g e so fp e o p l e ’ sb r a i n s
3 The welfare statement is made relative to the constraints the agent faces. For example, the agent
may be imperfectly informed of the consequences of his actions. In that case, the choice of x is welfare
maximizing given the agent’s information. If the agent had better information, he might choose y and
hence y is the welfare maximizing choice for a better informed agent. See our discussion of mistakes in
Section 5.1.
4 “Brain Experts Now Follow the Money,” by Sandra Blakeslee, New York Times, June 17, 2003.
7as they played the ultimatum game, a test of fairness between two people. In the
ultimatum game, the ﬁrst player is given, say, £10 in cash. He must then decide how
m u c ht og i v et oas e c o n dp l a y e r .I tc o u l db e£ 5 ,t h ef a i r e s to ﬀer, or a lesser amount
depending on what he thinks he can get away with. If Player 2 accepts the oﬀer, the
money is shared accordingly. But if he rejects it, both players go away empty-handed.
It is a one-shot game, and the players never meet again. Most people in the shoes of
Player 2 refuse to take amounts under £2 or £3, Dr. Cohen said. They would rather
punish the ﬁrst player than feel cheated. ‘But this makes no economic sense,’ he said.
‘You’re better oﬀ with something than nothing.’”
As the quotes above illustrate, neuroeconomics emphasizes the physiological and psycho-
logical processes underlying decision-making. T h eo bj e c t i v ei st or e l a t et h ed e c i s i o n - m a k i n g
process to physiological processes in the brain or to descriptions of emotional experiences.
From its predecessor, psychology and economics,5 neuroeconomics inherits the idea of
modeling the decision-maker as a collection of biases and heuristics susceptible to system-
atic errors (eﬀects) and inconsistencies (reversals). Hedonic utilities (true utilities) are
primitives, deﬁned independently of behavior, while behavior is determined by biases and
heuristics. The focus is on showing how factors that have no eﬀect on these true utilities—or
at least aﬀect these utilities in a manner that is ignored by standard economics—inﬂuence
behavior.
Neuroeconomics is therapeutic in its ambitions: it tries to improve an individual’s
objectives. The central questions of neuroeconomists are: How do individuals make their
choices? How eﬀective are they at making the choices that increase their own wellbeing?
By contrast, economists analyze how the choices of diﬀerent individuals interact within a
particular institutionals e t t i n g ,g i v e nt h e i rd i ﬀering objectives.
5 This line of inquiry is often referred to as behavioral economics. We have avoided using this term,
in order to distinguish it from standard economics models that deal with similar behavioral issues.
83. Diﬀerent Objectives Demand Diﬀerent Abstractions
N e u r o e c o n o m i s t sa r g u et h a tt h et i m ei sr i p ef o rt h em e t h o d o l o g yo fe c o n o m i c st o
be brought in line with the methods and ideas of psychology and neuroscience. The
neuroeconomic critique begins with the implicit or explicit assumption that economics,
psychology and possibly other social sciences all address the same set of questions and
diﬀer only with respect to the answers they provide:
“More ambitiously, students are often bewildered that the models of human nature of-
fered in diﬀerent social sciences are so diﬀerent, and often contradictory. Economists
emphasize rationality; psychologists emphasize cognitive limits and sensitivity of choi-
ces to contexts; anthropologists emphasize acculturation; and sociologists emphasize
norms and social constraint. An identical question on a ﬁnal exam in each of the
ﬁelds about trust, for example, would have diﬀerent “correct” answers in each of the
ﬁelds. It is possible that a biological basis for behavior in neuroscience, perhaps com-
bined with all-purpose tools like learning models or game theory, could provide some
uniﬁcation across the social sciences (cf. Gintis, 2003).” CLP (2004) p. 572-3.
Contrary to the view expressed in the quoted paragraph, economics and psychology do
not oﬀer competing, all-purpose models of human nature. Nor do they oﬀer all-purpose
tools. Rather, each discipline uses specialized abstractions that have proven useful for
that discipline. Not only is the word trust much less likely to come up in an economics
exam than in a psychology exam, but when it does appear in an economics exam, it means
something diﬀerent and is associated with a diﬀerent question, not just a diﬀerent answer.
Far from being an all-purpose tool, game theory is a formalism for stripping away all
strategically irrelevant details of the context, details that Gintis describes as central for
psychologists. Similarly, a learning model in economics is diﬀerent than a learning model in
psychology. For an economist, a theory of learning might be a process of Bayesian inference
in a multi-armed bandit model. This theory of learning is useful for addressing economic
phenomena such as patent races but may be inappropriate for cognitive psychologists.
Once the goals of economics and psychology are stated in a manner that makes it
seem as if the two disciplines address the same questions and deal with the same empirical
9evidence, it becomes reasonable for neuroeconomists to inquire which discipline has the
better answers and the better tools for providing answers. CLP (2005) write:
“First, we show that neuroscience ﬁndings raise questions about the usefulness of some
of the most common constructs that economists commonly use, such as risk aversion,
time preference, and altruism.” (p. 31-32)
Risk aversion and time preference are not only useful but also indispensable concepts
for modern economics. The authors really intend to question the validity of these con-
cepts; in essence, they are asserting that there is no such thing as risk aversion or time
preference. ‘Time preference’ and ‘risk aversion’ are useful economic abstractions just as
‘cue-conditioned cognitive process’ or ‘hedonic forecasting mechanisms’ are abstractions
useful in neuroscience and psychology. The truth (or falsehood) of an abstraction cannot
be evaluated independently; the only way to assess these abstractions by assessing — within
e a c hd i s c i p l i n e—t h et h e o r i e st h a tu s et h e m .
Consider the reverse procedure of using evidence from economics in brain science.
Suppose that we ﬁnd that drug addicts generally satisfy the strong axiom of revealed
preference in their demand behavior. Can we argue that since addicts maximize some
utility function, there are no separate brain functions and conclude then that the “limbic
system” does not exist? This line of reasoning is, of course, absurd because brain science
takes no position on whether choices satisfy the strong axiom of revealed preference or not.
T h ea r g u m e n tt h a te v i d e n c ef r o mb r a i ns c i e n c ec a nf a l s i f ye c o n o m i ct h e o r i e si se q u a l l y
absurd. Hsu and Camerer write,
“For neuroeconomists, knowing more about functional specialization, and how regions
collaborate in diﬀerent tasks, could substitute familiar distinctions between categories
of economic behavior (sometimes established arbitrarily by suggestions which become
modeling conventions) with new ones grounded in neural detail. For example, the
insula activity noted by Sanfey et al. in bargaining is also present when subjects
choose between gambles with ambiguous odds of winning, relative to ‘risky’ gambles
with known odds (Ming Hsu and Camerer, 2004).”
It is unlikely that an organization of behavior based on the level of insula activity would
be useful for economists who are not interested in the physiological mechanism behind
10the economic decisions. What Hsu and Camerer consider “distinctions based on arbitrary
modeling conventions” are likely to be much more useful to economists, given their own
objectives and given the type of data that is available to them.
The presumption that economics and psychology have the same goals and rely on the
same data facilitates three types of critiques of standard economics:
1. Failure of Rationality: Economic models of choice fail to take account of psychological
or physiological phenomena or evidence.
2. Inadequacy of Rationality: Rationality — deﬁned to mean some sort of consistency in
the behavior and preferences of individuals — is not an adequate starting point for
economics because consistency of behaviors does not mean that these behavior will
lead to good outcomes.
3. Uniﬁcation: Recent advances neuroscience provide rich new sources of data. Eco-
nomics must take advantage of these developments.
We address these arguments in sections 5, 6, and 7 respectively. We illustrate in
the remainder of this section how the diﬀerent goals psychology and economics and the
diﬀerent data available to these two disciplines necessitate diﬀerent abstractions.
3.1 A Cue or a Complement?
The concept of a “cue” oﬀers a good illustration of how abstractions from psychology
are inappropriate for economics and, conversely, how the corresponding economic con-
cepts are inappropriate for psychology and neuroscience. Psychologists call a stimulus
that triggers a desire or a craving for a particular consumption or activity a “cue” or a
“cue-elicited craving.”6 For example, eating a hamburger may be a cue that triggers a
craving for French fries. Drinking coﬀee may trigger a craving for cigarettes. Visiting the
location of previous drug consumption may trigger a craving for drugs. As the example of
drug consumption illustrates, cues may be determined endogenously through a process of
conditioning.7 Psychologists ﬁnd the concept of a cue useful because they think of cues as
6 See Laibson (2001) for an economic model that describes psychological cues.
7 The agent frequently consumed the drug at a particular location and - as a result of this consumption
history - being in that location triggers a craving for drugs. Similarly, the agent frequently smoked a
cigarette while drinking coﬀee in the past. This - perhaps incidental - pairing of consumption goods in the
past implies that coﬀee consumption triggers a craving for cigarettes.
11exogenous variables in experimental settings. They investigate the physiological mecha-
nisms behind the development of and the reaction to cues. For economists, the notion of a
c u ei sn o tu s e f u lb e c a u s ei tl u m p st o g e t h er two distinct economic phenomena: complements
and externalities.
Hamburgers and fries are comp l e m e n t a r yg o o d sj u s tl i k ef o r k sa n dk n i v e s .F o r k sd on o t
generate a craving for knives and therefore psychologists would not consider the fork/knife
complementarity to be the same phenomenon as the hamburger/fries complementarity. For
economists the physiological distinction between the two examples is unimportant. What
matters is that demand for those goods responds in a similar way to price changes.
Another form of complementarities is the one associated with non-separable prefer-
ences over consumption streams. For example, consider an individual who enjoys building
matchstick models and, as a result of this hobby, develops a complementary demand for
matches and glue. The complementary demand for matches and glue is acquired through
learning a hobby while the complementary demand for coﬀee and cigarettes is acquired
through a process of conditioning. For a psychologist, who is interested in the underlying
causes of preferences, the coﬀee/cigarette and glue/matchsticks complementarities repre-
sent distinct phenomena. The ﬁrst is an example of conditioning while the second is an
example of learning. However, both examples are similar in terms of the variables that
economists observe and care about (prices, demand).
In the cue-response pairs above, the individual controls both the cue and the response.
However, some cues are not under the control of the individual. For example, a former drug
addict may experience a craving for drugs as he observes drug dealers in his neighborhood.
In economics, this eﬀect is captured by the notion of an externality. For economists, the
neighborhood eﬀe c to nd r u ga d d i c t si ss i m i l a rt ot h ee ﬀect of an improved network of roads
on car buyers. Both are examples of an externality that causes a shift in the demand for a
good. For psychologists, the craving for drugs by seeing drug-dealers in the neighborhood
is similar to the craving for cigarettes caused by drinking coﬀee. On the other hand, they
would consider it absurd to describe the car buying example and drug addiction example
as being the same phenomenon because the underlying psychological mechanisms are very
diﬀerent. It would be equally absurd to insist that economists treat the neighborhood
12eﬀect on drug demand as the same phenomenon as the cigarette/coﬀee complementarity.
In economics, there are important reasons for distinguishing between complementarities
and externalities. For example, externalities often suggest market failures while comple-
mentarities do not.
Economists and psychologists use diﬀerent abstractions because they are interested in
diﬀerent phenomena and must confront diﬀerent data. ‘Cue-triggered responses’ is not a
useful abstraction in economics because it lumps together distinct economic phenomena.
Conversely, the economic abstraction of a complement is not useful in psychology because
it lumps together phenomena with diﬀerent psychological mechanisms.
4. The Two Approaches: Examples
In this section, we illustrate the standard approach to novel behavioral phenomena
with a discussion of the paper “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice
Theory,” by Kreps and Porteus (1978). We illustrate the neuroeconomics approach with
a recent paper by K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2005) entitled “Reference-Dependent Utility.”
4.1 The Standard Approach: Resolution of Uncertainty
An individual goes to the hospital on Friday to have a biopsy of a suspicious mass. In
case the biopsy detects cancer, surgery will be scheduled for the following Monday. When
given a choice between waiting a few hours to learn the result or going home and learning
the result on Monday, the individual chooses to wait. The decision to incur the cost of
waiting seems plausible but is inconsistent with standard theory. Standard expected utility
maximizers are indiﬀerent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty.
In “Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice” Kreps and Porteus
(1978) (henceforth Kreps-Porteus) expand the standard model of decision making under
uncertainty to include anxious individuals such as the patient in the example above.8
Suppose there are two dates t =1 ,2a n daﬁnite set of prizes Z that will be consumed at
date 2 (“surgery” or “no surgery” in the example above). Standard decision theory under
uncertainty deﬁnes lotteries over Z as the choice objects. But this description does not
8 The relationship between anxiety and preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty is explored
and further developed in the work of Caplin and Leahy (2001).
13diﬀerentiate between lotteries that resolve at date 1 and lotteries that resolve at date 2 -
and therefore cannot capture the anxious patient described above.
Let D2 be the lotteries over Z and let D1 be lotteries over D2.H e n c e , D1 is the
set of lotteries over lotteries over Z. We refer to elements of D1 as date-1 lotteries and
elements of D2 as date-2 lotteries. We can describe the problem of the anxious patient
a sac h o i c eb e t w e e nt w ol o t t e r i e si nD1. Suppose the probability of surgery is α.W a i t i n g
for the results until Monday corresponds to a date-1 lottery where, with probability 1,
the individual will face the date 2 lottery that yields surgery with probability α and no
surgery with probability 1 − α. Learning the result on Friday corresponds to the date-1
lottery where, with probability α, the individual faces a date-2 lottery that yields surgery
with probability 1 and, with probability 1 − α, the individual faces a date-2 lottery that
yields surgery with probability 0.
Let p,q denote elements in D2 and µ,ν denote elements in D1.F o r s i m p l i c i t y , w e
only consider lotteries with ﬁnite supports. Let µ(p)b et h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tµ chooses the
lottery p ∈ D2. Standard expected utility theory identiﬁes µ with the implied probability





to prize z ∈ Z. Therefore, standard expected utility theory cannot accommodate the
cancer patient’s strict preference for learning the test results on Friday.
The Kreps-Porteus model takes as a primitive an individual’s preferences º (choices)
over the date-1 lotteries, D1. Some date-1 lotteries yield a particular date-2 lottery with
probability 1. We call such lotteries degenerate date-1 lotteries. In the example above,
learning the test results on Monday corresponds to such a lottery. Restricting the pref-
erence º to degenerate date-1 lotteries, induces a preference on D2, the date-2 lotteries.
Let δp denote the date-1 lottery that yields the date-2 lottery p with probability 1. The
induced preference º2 (on D2)i sd e ﬁned as follows:
p º2 q if and only if δp º δq
14Kreps-Porteus assume that º and º2 satisfy the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms: hence, the preferences are complete, transitive, satisfy the independence axiom,
and satisfy an appropriate continuity assumption. Kreps-Porteus show that the preferences
on D1 satisfy those assumptions if and only if there are utility functions u and W such



















The formula above applies the standard expected utility formula twice. The term in
brackets is the expected utility formula for lotteries that resolve at date 2 whereas the
outer term is the expected utility formula for lotteries that resolve at date 1.
The Kreps-Porteus formalism yields a precise deﬁnition of a new phenomenon: pref-
erence for early (or late) resolution of uncertainty.L e t µ,ν be two elements of D1 that
imply the same distribution over prizes. The lottery µ resolves all uncertainty at date 1
while the lottery ν resolves all uncertainty at date 2. In the example above, µ corresponds
to the situation where the patient learns the test result on Friday and ν corresponds to the
situation where the patient learns the test result on Monday. The individual has a prefer-
ence for early resolution of uncertainty if he prefers µ over ν. Kreps-Porteus show that a
preference for early resolution of uncertainty implies (and is implied by) the convexity of
W.
Note the key steps in the modeling exercise: Kreps-Porteus start with a novel psy-
chological phenomenon and identify the economically relevant consequences of that phe-
nomenon. Once the economically meaningful consequences are identiﬁed, the psychological
causes become irrelevant. For the patient above, the source of the preference for early res-
olution of uncertainty is anxiety. But there could be many other reasons for a preference
for early resolution of uncertainty. Suppose, for example, the agent owns a lottery ticket
that will either yield a large reward (with small probability) or nothing. Prior to the
lottery drawing, the agent must decide which car to purchase. The outcome of the lot-
tery will typically aﬀect the optimal car buying decision and, therefore, the agent would
be better oﬀ if the lottery drawing was held earlier. Hence, the induced preferences over
lotteries imply a preference for early resolution of uncertainty. In this case, the agent has
15perfectly standard preferences. The preference for early resolution of uncertainty comes
about because the agent has a second payoﬀ-relevant decision to make after choosing a
lottery.
In the two examples, the causes of the decision-maker’s preference for early resolution
of uncertainty are diﬀerent. In the ﬁrst example the patient is trying to avoid anxiety
while in the second decision problem he is trying to make a better informed decision.
For a standard economist this distinction is irrelevant because standard economics does
not study the causes of preferences. For standard theory, the only relevant distinctions
between the two examples are the ones that can be identiﬁed through the decision-makers’
preferences.9
The Kreps-Porteus theorem identiﬁes a formula that resembles standard expected
utility applied separately at each decision date. While the formula is suggestive of a mental
process, this suggestiveness is an expositional devices not meant to be taken literally.10 The
formula encapsulates the behavioral assumptions of the theory in a user-friendly way and
thereby facilitates applications of the theory to (more complicated) economic problems.
The theory is successful if preference for early resolution of uncertainty turns out
to be an empirically important phenomenon; that is, if models that incorporate it are
successful at addressing economic behavior. The role of the axioms is to summarize the
empirical content of the theory independently of the speciﬁc application. The generality
of representation theorem, the usefulness of the key parameters, the ease with which the
parameters can be measured and, most importantly, the empirical success of the model at
dealing with economic evidence determine t h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h et h e o r ys u c c e e d s .
Kreps-Porteus’s model has been generalized and applied to Macroeconomics and Fi-
nance (see Epstein and Zin (1991a, 1991b)). These ﬁelds analyze dynamic consumption
choice under uncertainty. The primitives of Kreps-Porteus’s model (dated lotteries) are
9 For example, the Kreps-Porteus independence axiom may not be appropriate in the case where the
agent has a second decision to make whereas the anxious patient might very well satisfy it.
10 A teacher in an intermediate micro class might say something like, “the consumer equates the marginal
utility of consuming the good to the marginal utility of the last dollar spent on the good,” while explaining
a ﬁrst order condition in a partial equilibrium model with separable preferences. This statement is meant to
provide some intuition for the ﬁrst order condition, not as a description of the consumer’s mental process:
the marginal utilities in question depend on the particular utility function used to represent the preference
and hence are, to some extent, arbitrary. There is no presumption that either these particular marginal
utilities or the underlying calculus arguments are the actual currency of the consumer’s reasoning.
16easily adapted to match closely the objects studied in Macroeconomics and Finance. The
fact that Kreps-Porteus strip all economically irrelevant details from their model is essential
for the success of this adaptation.
4.2 Neuroeconomics: Reference Dependent Utility
In a well-known experiment (Thaler 1980)), a random subset of the subjects are
assigned one unit of some object and then all subjects’ reservation prices for this object
are elicited. The price at which subjects who were assigned a unit are willing to sell it
typically exceeds the price at which the remaining subjects are willing to buy a unit. This
phenomenon is referred to as the endowment eﬀect and has motivated models that add a
reference point to the utility function.
K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2005) (henceforth K¨ oszegi-Rabin) propose a novel reference-
dependent preference theory. To understand the K¨ oszegi-Rabin theory, consider a ﬁnite
s e to fc h o i c eo b j e c t sX.11 A reference-dependent utility function U, associates a utility
with each reference point z ∈ X and each choice object x ∈ X.H e n c e ,U : X × X → I R,
where U(x,z) is the utility of x given the reference z. This formulation of utility is not
n e w ;t h en o v e l t yi si nt h ea d o p t i o no fK ¨ oszegi (2004)’s notion of a personal equilibrium to
determine the reference point.
K¨ oszegi-Rabin deﬁne the reference point as the x that ultimately gets chosen. With
this interpretation, reference-dependent utility maximization yields for any choice set A,
those elements x ∈ A such that
U(x,x) ≥ U(y,x)( 2 )
for all y ∈ A. Hence, an alternative x ∈ A is optimal (i.e., a possible choice) for a K¨ oszegi-
Rabin decision-maker if (and only if) condition (2) above is satisﬁed. K¨ oszegi-Rabin assume







µ(uk(x) − uk(y)) (3)
where µ is an increasing function with µ(0) = 0 and K is some ﬁnite set indexing the
relevant hedonic dimensions of consumption. K¨ oszegi-Rabin note that these consumption
dimensions “should be speciﬁed based on psychological principles.”
11 An element x ∈ X may be uncertain (i.e., may be a lottery).
17K¨ oszegi-Rabin also require that
U(x,y) ≥ U(y,y)i m p l i e sU(x,x) >U(y,x)( 4 )
for all x,y ∈ X.
There are certain striking diﬀerences between the approaches of Kreps-Porteus and
K¨ oszegi-Rabin. In Kreps-Porteus, the formula is an “as if” statement and the assumed
restrictions on choice behavior (axioms) are the content of the theory. In contrast, K¨ oszegi-
Rabin interpret the procedure associated with computing a personal equilibrium as a de-
scription of the underlying psychological process. K¨ oszegi-Rabin focus on psychological
evidence supporting this procedure and the various assumptions on the function U.
To facilitate the comparison of the diﬀerence in the two approaches, we provide a
revealed preference analysis of the K¨ oszegi-Rabin model for the case of no uncertainty.12
Let X be ﬁnite and let Y be the set of all nonempty subsets of X. A function c : Y → Y is a
choice function if c(A) ⊂ A for all A ∈ Y . In revealed preference terms, the K¨ oszegi-Rabin
model is an investigation of a special class of choice functions. Given any state dependent
utility function U,d e ﬁne C(·,U)a sf o l l o w s :
C(A,U)={x ∈ A|U(x,x) ≥ U(y,x)∀y ∈ A}
A choice function c is ag e n e r a lK ¨ oszegi-Rabin choice function if there exists a reference
dependent utility function U such that c = C(·,U). If the U also satisﬁes (3) and (4)
then c is a as p e c i a lK ¨ oszegi-Rabin choice function. For any binary relation º,d e ﬁne the
function Cº as follows:
Cº(A)={x ∈ A|x º z∀z ∈ A}
It is easy to construct examples where Cº(A)=∅ unless certain assumptions are made on
º.W es a yt h a tt h ec h o i c ef u n c t i o nc is induced by the binary relation º,i fc(A)=Cº(A)
for all A ∈ Y .I ti sw e l l - k n o w nt h a tCº is a choice function whenever º is complete (x º y
or y º x for all x,y ∈ X)a n dt r a n s i t i v e( x º y and y º z implies x º z for all x,y,z ∈ X).
12 K¨ oszegi-Rabin emphasize applications to decision making under uncertainty. Since we limit our
analysis to a setting without uncertainty, our revealed preference “version” only captures the K¨ oszegi-
Rabin model for a limited set of applications.
18However, transitivity is not necessary for Cº to be a choice function. The proposition
characterizes K¨ oszegi-Rabin choice functions:
Proposition: T h ef o l l o w i n gt h r e ec o n d i t i o n sa r ee q u i v a l e n t :
(i) c is a general K¨ oszegi-Rabin choice function
(ii) c is a choice function induced by some complete binary relation
(iii) c is a special K¨ oszegi-Rabin choice function
Proof: See Appendix
Note that c = Cº is a choice function implies º is complete. Hence, we may omit the
word complete in the above proposition. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) establishes that
abandoning transitivity is the only revealed preference implication of the K¨ oszegi-Rabin
theory. The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) implies that the particular functional form (3) and
condition (4) are without loss of generality.
Note the distinction between the K¨ oszegi-Rabin approach and our approach to the
same model. We take the revealed choice behavior c as given and construct the U (or
uk’s, µ) that are needed to generate this behavior. K¨ oszegi-Rabin would argue that these
functions and the dimensions of relevant consumption are not choice variables for the
theorist, and that they should be determined based on psychological principles.
The revealed preference analysis answers the following question: suppose the modeler
could not determine the individual ingredients that go into the representation, how can
he check whether or not the decision-maker behaves in a manner consistent with such a
representation? Or to put it diﬀerently, how is the behavior of a K¨ oszegi-Rabin-decision
maker diﬀerent from a standard decision-maker? The answer turns out be that the revealed
preference relation of the K¨ oszegi-Rabin decision-maker may fail transitivity.
The diﬀerence between the Kreps-Porteus and the K¨ oszegi-Rabin approaches can be
re-stated as follows: Kreps-Porteus assume that the utility functions W, u can be measured
only by observing choices. The choice of a lottery in period 1 is treated as observable, while
the utility functions are the modeler’s abstractions, and are taken to be unobservable. Re-
strictions on the particular functional form are inferred from choice behavior. For example,
19if the agent prefers lotteries that resolve early to lotteries that imply the same distribution
over prizes but resolve late, then the utility function W must be convex. Hence, behavior
is used to calibrate the model before additional predictions can be made.
In contrast, K¨ oszegi-Rabin do not view the representation as an “as if” statement.
They treat the relevant dimension of hedonic utility and the values of the various op-
t i o n sa l o n gt h e s ed i m e n s i o n sa so b s e r v a b l ea n dq u a n t i ﬁable. They emphasize that this
quantiﬁcation requires craft and an understanding of psychological principles.
“Several aspects of our theory, however, render it short of fully general and formu-
laically applicable. Many of our speciﬁc assumptions are based on intuition rather
than direct evidence.” (p. 31).
The assumptions of many theoretical models are based on intuition rather than direct
evidence. But in standard models, any future test of the assumptions and the underlying
intuitions requires direct (revealed-preference) evidence. Where K¨ oszegi-Rabin diﬀer from
standard economics is that intuition based on psychological principles is viewed as an
alternative form of evidence and it is this type of evidence that is the focus of their
attention.13
In K¨ oszegi-Rabin, utility indices (uk’s) and attachment disutilities (measured by µ)a r e
hedonic utilities and are distinct from choice utilities. The K¨ oszegi-Rabin representation is
not only a theory of choice but also a description of the underlying psychological process:
“By all intuition and evidence, the feeling of loss when giving up a mug is a real
hedonic experience, and making choices reﬂecting that real hedonic experience is partly
rational. But as interpreted by Kahneman (2001) and Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and
Rabin (2003), people seem to over-attend to this experience because they ignore that
the sensation of loss will pass very quickly — behaving as if they would spend much
time longing for the mug they once had.”
Hence, measured feelings are inputs in the K¨ oszegi-Rabin analysis. The authors believe
that these measurements will enable the analyst to identify hedonic utilities that capture
the intrinsic satisfaction of consuming the good (i.e., the uk’s) and hedonic utilities that
13 “In K¨ oszegi and Rabin (2004), the previous version of this paper, we argue at length (as we do
brieﬂy in the conclusion of this paper) that the consumption dimensions used in our framework should be
speciﬁed based on psychological principles, and not necessarily correspond directly to quantities of diﬀerent
products.”
20capture the real loss associated with giving up the good. Moreover, they expect hedonic
measurements to distinguish behavior that results from rational assessment of utilities from
behavior that results from over-attending to utilities.
For Kreps-Porteus, the physical parameters, choices etc. constitute the evidence and
utilities are parameters that can only be inferred from behavior. The Kreps-Porteus model
relates observed choice behavior in one setting to subsequent behavior by using the ﬁrst
set of observations to calibrate the relevant parameters. In contrast, K¨ oszegi-Rabin utilize
the analyst’s understanding of psychological principles for their measurement. Hence,
K¨ oszegi-Rabin plan to calibrate the model using psychological evidence and intuitions.
They view the Kreps-Porteus-type insistence on calibrating through revealed preferences
as an unnecessary demand for “formulaic applicability.”
Since Kreps-Porteus’s and K¨ oszegi-Rabin’s models rely in diﬀerent evidence (i.e., have
ad i ﬀerent deﬁnition of what is observable), their respective theories have diﬀerent content.
Within the standard approach, a theorist can make two kinds of contributions: ﬁrst, he can
deﬁne the boundaries of his theory; that is, provide a representation theorem that identi-
ﬁes all of the revealed-preference implications of his theory. Kreps-Porteus’s main theorem
shows that the revealed preference implications of their theory consist of a weakened ver-
sion of the standard independence axiom, completeness, transitivity and continuity. The
proposition above does the same for the K¨ oszegi-Rabin theory. Second, a standard the-
orist can relate speciﬁc revealed preferences to particular restrictions on the parameters
of the model. Uniqueness results, characterizations of risk aversion, characterization of
preference for early resolution of uncertainty, and duality theorems of demand theory all
fall within this category.
In K¨ oszegi-Rabin, the revealed preference consequences of their theory are of minor
interest. Instead, the model’s success is ju d g e db yt h ee x t e n tt ow h i c ht h ep s y c h o l o g i c a l
process suggested by their formula matches psychological evidence.
215. The Failure of Rationality
Neuroeconomists share with many other critics of economics the view that individual
rationality is an empirically invalid assumption. Over the years, critics of rationality have
identiﬁed various economic assumptions as ‘rationality.’ The independence axiom, prob-
abilistic sophistication, monotonicity of payoﬀs in the agent’s own consumption, or the
independence of payoﬀs from the consumption of others have all been viewed as implica-
tions of rationality before the emergence of economic models that relax these assumptions.
More recent criticisms of rationality focus on the fact that individuals make systematic
mistakes even in situations where the right choice is clear. The most ambitious critics
of rationality argue that the idea of utility maximization is ﬂawed because individuals
do not maximize any preference relation. In section 5.2 we argue that these criticisms
typically underestimate the ﬂexibility revealed preference methodology. In particular, we
illustrate how standard economics deals with ‘mistakes.’ In section 5.1, we focus on the
evidence reported by neuroeconomists in support of their criticism. We observe that much
of this evidence misses its target because economic models make no predictions about
physiological processes that underly decision making.
5.1 The Neuroeconomic Case Against Preference Maximization:
CLP (2004) oﬀer a short-list of neuroeconomic evidence against the “standard eco-
nomic concept of preference.” The list begins with the following item:
“Feelings of pleasure and pain originate in homeostatic mechanisms that detect depar-
tures from a “set-point” or ideal level, and attempt to restore equilibrium. In some
cases, these attempts do not require additional voluntary actions, e.g., when monitors
for body temperature trigger sweating to cool you oﬀ and shivering to warm you up. In
other cases, the homeostatic processes operate by changing momentary preferences, a
process called “alliesthesia” (Cabanac, 1979). When the core body temperature falls be-
low the 98.6F set-point, almost anything that raises body temperature (such as placing
one’s hand in warm water) feels good, and the opposite is true when body temperature
is too high. Similarly, monitors for blood sugar levels, intestinal distention and many
other variables trigger hunger. Homeostasis means preferences are “state-dependent”
22in a special way: The states are internal to the body and both aﬀect preferences and
act as information signals which provoke equilibration....” (CLP (2004), p. 562)
No observation in the above cited paragraph contradicts any principle of preference maxi-
mization. Economic models make no predictions or assumptions about body temperature,
blood sugar levels, or other physiological data and therefore such data cannot refute eco-
nomic models. Standard economics is not committed to a particular theory of what makes
p e o p l ef e e lg o o d .N o rd o e si ta s s u m et h a tf e e l i n gg o o di sw h a tp e o p l ec a r ea b o u t .
The second item challenges the adequacy of revealed preference data:
“Inferring preferences from a choice does not tell us everything we need to know, and
may tell us very little. Consider the hypothetical case of two people, Al and Naucia,
who both refuse to buy peanuts at a reasonable price (cf. Romer, 2000). The refusal to
buy reveals a common disutility for peanuts. But Al turned down the peanuts because
he is allergic: consuming peanuts causes a prickly rash, shortens his breath, and could
even be fatal. Naucia turned down the peanuts because she ate a huge bag of peanuts at
a circus years ago, and subsequently got sick from eating too much candy at the same
time. Since then, her gustatory system associates peanuts with illness and she refuses
them at reasonable prices. While Al and Naucia both revealed an identical disutility,
a neurally-detailed account tells us more. Al has an inelastic demand for peanuts-you
can’t pay him enough to eat them!-while Naucia would try a ﬁstful for the right price.
..... (CLP (2004), p. 563)
It is often impossible to infer preferences from a single decision. In fact, ﬁnding a small
class of such experiments to identify the individual’s utility function is the central concern
of revealed preference theory. Hence, not buying peanuts at a single price does not imply
“...Al and Naucia both revealed an identical disutility” and while “a neurally-detailed ac-
count” could “tell us more,” the economically meaningful information can only be elicited
with a change in prices. In standard economics, the reasons for a particular ranking of
alternatives is irrelevant. That Al might die from consuming peanuts and Naucia simply
doesn’t like consuming them matters only if at some price Naucia is willing to do so and Al
is not; and even then, it is the latter fact and not the underlying reasons that are relevant.
We delay the discussion of the third item to the next section where we discuss welfare
analysis. The fourth item discusses money illusion:
23“A fourth problem with preference is that people are assumed to value money for what
it can purchase — that is, the utility of income is indirect, and should be derived from
direct utilities for goods that will be purchased with money. But roughly speaking, it
appears that similar brain circuitry — dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain — is active
for a wide variety of rewarding experiences — drugs, food, attractive faces (cite), humor
(cite) — and money rewards. This means money may be directly rewarding, and it’s
loss painful....” (CLP (2004), p. 565.)
There are straightforward economic tests for identifying money illusion. Such a test would
entail changing prices and nominal wages in a manner that leaves the set of feasible con-
sumption, labor supply pairs unchanged. Then, we could check if this change has shifted
the labor supply curve. But the issue cannot be addressed by investigating the brain cir-
cuitry and the midbrain, since economic model sa r es i l e n to nt h eb r a i na c t i v i t ya s s o c i a t e d
with decision making.
The ﬁnal item deals with addiction:
“Addiction is an important topic for economics because it seems to resist rational
explanation. .... It is relevant to rational models of addiction that every substance to
which humans may become biologically addicted is also potentially addictive for rats.
Addictive substances appear therefore to be “hijacking” primitive reward circuitry in
the “old” part of the human brain. Although this fact does not disprove the rational
model (since recently-evolved cortex may override rat-brain circuitry), it does show that
rational intertemporal planning is not necessary to create the addictive phenomena of
tolerance, craving, and withdrawal. It also highlights the need for economic models of
the primitive reward circuitry, which would apply equally to man and rat. .....” (CLP
(2004) p. 565-566).
That substances addictive for rats are also addictive in humans is not relevant for economics
because (standard) economics does not study rats.14 It also does not study the causes of
preferences. To say that a decision-maker prefers x to y is to say that he never chooses
y when x is also available, nothing more. Hence, addiction can be identiﬁed as a distinct
14 Presumably, psychologists interested in human physiology ﬁnd it worthwhile to study rats because
of the similarities in the neurological make-up of the two species. Apparently, the similarities between the
economic institutions of the two species are not suﬃcient to generate interests in rats among economists.
24economic phenomenon only through its distinct choice implications not through the under-
lying brain processes. The fact that addictive substances appear to be “hijacking primitive
reward circuitry,” fails to disprove the rational model not because the cortex may override
rat-brain circuitry but because the rational model addresses neither the brain-circuitry nor
the cortex.
What the authors describe as evidence is in fact a statement of a their philosophical
position. They have decided that the cortex represents planned action (rational choice),
while certain processes in other parts (presumably in the midbrain) represent overwhelming
physiological inﬂuences (i.e., the hijacking of the primitive reward circuitry). Hence, every
decision that is associated with the latter types of processes is interpreted as evidence
that rational choice theory is wrong. This critique fails because standard economics takes
no position on whether a particular decision represents a manifestation of free will or a
succumbing to biological necessity. Rationality in economics is not tied to physiological
causes of behavior and therefore the physiological mechanisms cannot shed light on whether
a choice is rational or not in the sense economists use the term. Brain mechanisms by
themselves cannot oﬀer evidence against transitivity of preferences or any other choice-
theoretic assumption. Therefore, evidence that utility maximization is not a good model
of the brain cannot refute economic models.
Discussing decision making under uncertainty, Camerer (2005) writes:
“For example, when economists think about gambling they assume that people combine
the chance of winning (probability) with an expectation of how they will value winning
and losing (“utilities”). If this theory is correct, neuroeconomics will ﬁnd two processes
in the brain — one for guessing how likely one is to win and lose, and another for
evaluating the hedonic pleasure and pain of winning and losing-and another brain
region which combines probability and hedonic sensations. More likely, neuroeconomics
will show that the desire or aversion to gamble is more complicated than that simple
model.”
Camerer assumes that there is one set of correct abstractions for both economics and
neuroscience and tries to identify whether the ones currently used in economics belong to
that set. The conceptual separation between probabilities and utilities is very important for
25expected utility theory. This separation need not have a physiological counterpart. Even
if it did, mapping that process into the physiology of the brain and seeing if it amounts to
“one [process] for guessing how likely one is to win and lose, and another for evaluating the
hedonic pleasure and pain of winning and losing-and another brain region which combines
probability and hedonic sensations” is a problem for neuroscience, not economics. Since
expected utility theory makes predictions only about choice behavior, its validity can be
assessed only through choice evidence. If economic evidence leads us to the conclusion that
expected utility theory is appropriate in a particular set of applications, then the inability
to match this theory to the physiology of the brain might be considered puzzling. But this
puzzle is a concern for neuroscientists, not economists.
Standard economics does not address mental processes and, as a result, economic
abstractions are typically not appropriate for describing them. In his (1998) survey, Rabin
criticizes standard economics for failing to be a good model of the mind, even though
standard economics never had such ambitions:
“Economists have traditionally assumed that, when faced with uncertainty, people cor-
rectly form their subjective probabilistic assessments according to the laws of probabil-
ity. But researchers have documented many systematic departures from rationality in
judgment under uncertainty.”
Many economists (including the authors of many introductory economic textbooks) are
a w a r et h a tm o s tp e o p l ed on o tt h i n ki nt e r m so fp r o b a b i l i t i e s ,s u b j e c t i v eo ro t h e r w i s e .
Nor does standard economics assume that consumers know Bayes’ law in the sense that a
graduate student in economics would be expected to know it. Economic models connect to
reality through economic variables, prices, quantities etc. and not through their modeling
of the individual’s decision-making process. Evidence of the sort cited in neuroeconomics
may inspire economists to write diﬀerent models but it cannot reject economic models.
Our central argument is simple: neurosciencee v i d e n c ec a n n o tr e f u t ee c o n o m i cm o d e l s
because the latter make no assumptions or draw no conclusions about physiology of the
brain. Conversely, brain science cannot revolutionize economics because it has no vehicle
for addressing the concerns of the latter. Economics and psychology diﬀer in the question
they ask. Therefore, abstractions that are useful for one discipline will typically be not
26very useful for the other. The concepts of a preference, a choice function, demand function,
G D P ,u t i l i t y ,e t c .h a v ep r o v e nt ob eu s e f u la b s t r a c t i o ni ne c o n o m i c s .T h ef a c tt h a tt h e y
are less useful for the analysis of the brain does not mean that they are bad abstractions
in economics.
5.2 Mistakes
Individuals sometimes make obviously bad decisions. Neuroeconomists use this fact
as proof of the failure revealed preference theory. Bernheim and Rangel (2005) provide the
following example:
“(...) American visitors to the UK suﬀer numerous injuries and fatalities because they
often look only to the left before stepping into streets, even though they know traﬃc
approaches from the right. One cannot reasonably attribute this to the pleasure of
looking left or to masochistic preferences. The pedestrian’s objectives - to cross the
street safely - are clear, and the decision is plainly a mistake.”
Standard economics has long recognized that there are situations where an outsider could
improve an individual’s decisions. Such situations come up routinely when agents are
asymmetrically informed. Hence, standard economics deals with ‘mistakes’ by employing
the tool of information economics.
Consider the following thought experiment. A prize ($100) is placed either in a red
or in a blue box and the agent knows that there is a 60% chance that the money is in the
r e db o x .C o n f r o n t e dw i t hac h o i c eb e t w e e nt h et w ob o x e s ,t h ea g e n tc h o o s e st h er e db o x .
An observer who has seen that the money was placed in the blue box may think that the
agent prefers choosing red to getting $100. This inference is obviously incorrect because
“choose $100” is a strategy that is not available to the agent. The observer who thinks
the agent prefers red to $100 has not understood the agent’s constraints. Given agent’s
constraints, his choice of the red box is optimal.
Many situations in which agents systematically make mistakes can be interpreted as
situations where agents face subjective constraints on the feasible strategies that are not
apparent from the description of the decision problem. The strategy “only cross the street
when no car is approaching” may be unavailable in the sense that it violates a subjective
constraint on the set of feasible strategies. Hence, a standard economic model of the
27street-crossing problem would add a constraint on the set of feasible strategies as part of
the description of the agent.
Suppose the economist asserts that the American tourist prefers not being run over
by a car but ﬁnds it more diﬃcult to implement that outcome in the UK than in the US.
As evidence for this assertion the economist could point to data showing that American
tourists in London avoid unregulated intersections. That tourists incur a cost to cross at
regulated intersections suggests (i) they are unable to safely cross the street without help
and (ii) they are not suicidal.
Framing eﬀects can be addressed in a similar fashion. Experimenters can often ma-
nipulate the choices of individuals by restating the decision problem in a diﬀerent (but
equivalent) form. Standard theory interprets a framing eﬀect as changes in the subjective
constraints (or information) faced by the decision maker. It may turn out that a sign that
alerts the American tourist to ‘look right’ alters the decision even though such a sign does
not change the set of alternatives. The standard model incorporates this eﬀect by assum-
ing that the sign changes the set of feasible strategies for the tourist and thereby alters
t h ed e c i s i o n .W i t ht h eh e l po ft h es i g n ,t h et o u r i s tm a yb ea b l et oi m p l e m e n tt h es t r a t e g y
“always look right then go” while without the sign this strategy may not be feasible for the
tourist.
For standard economics, the fact that individuals make mistakes is relevant only if
these mistakes can be identiﬁed through economic data. That behavior would have been
diﬀerent under a counter-factual scenario in which the agent did not make or was prevented
from making these mistakes, is irrelevant.
6. The Inadequacy of Rationality
Neuroeconomists criticize both standard positive economics and standard normative
analysis. In the previous section, we described and responded to the neuroeconomic cri-
tique of positive economics. Here, we address the neuroeconomic critique of normative
economics.
Kahneman (1994) notes that “[t]he term ‘utility’ can be anchored in the hedonic expe-
rience of outcomes, or in the preference or desire for that outcome.” Because agents make
28mistakes, neuroeconomists conclude that a person’s choices do not maximize the hedonic
consequences these choices. More generally, neuroeconomists argue that choices do not
maximizing the individual’s well-being or happiness.
The neuroeconomic critique of standard welfare analysis relies on two related argu-
ments: ﬁrst, what people choose often fails to make them happy. Second, proper welfare
analysis should be based on what makes people happy and such measurements necessitate
neuroscientiﬁc input. Even if direct measurement of happiness through brain scans is not
yet feasible, neuroeconomists believe that such measurement will eventually be possible.
“A third problem with preferences is that there are diﬀerent types of utilities which
do not always coincide.(...) For example, Berridge and Robinson (1998) have found
distinct brain regions for “wanting” and “liking,” which correspond roughly to choice
utility and experienced utility. The fact that these areas are dissociated allows a wedge
between those two kinds of utility... If the diﬀerent types of utility are produced by
diﬀerent regions, they will not always match up. Examples are easy to ﬁnd. Infants
reveal a choice utility by putting dirt in their mouths, but they don’t rationally antici-
pate liking it. Addicts often report drug craving (wanting) which leads to consumption
(choosing) that they say is not particularly pleasurable (experiencing). Compulsive
shoppers buy goods (revealing choice utility) which they never use (no experienced
utility)(...)” CLP (2004, p. 564).
Neuroeconomists use such evidence and related (thought) experiments to suggest that the
concept of a preference that simultaneously determines behavior and “what is good for the
a g e n t ”c a nb ew i d eo ﬀ the mark. Hence, neuroeconomists distinguish between “decision
utilities”, which generate behavior, and “experienced utilities” which indicate what makes
the agent happy.
In section 6.2, we discuss and respond to this neuroeconomic critique of standard
welfare analysis. In sections 6.3 and 6.4, we consider two examples of substantive ratio-
nality in the literature: recent proposals for paternalism (section 6.3) and welfare analysis
in multi-self models (section 6.4). First, we provide a brief summary of standard welfare
economics.
296.1 Standard Welfare Analysis
Economists use welfare analysis to examine how institutions mediate the interests of
the participating individuals . W e l f a r ei m p r o v i n gc h a n g e st oa ne c o n o m i ci n s t i t u t i o na r e
deﬁned to be changes to which the individual(s) would agree. The policy x is deemed better
than the policy y for an individual if and only if, given the opportunity, the individual
would choose x over y.T h ec h o i c eo fx over y may be motivated by the pursuit of happiness,
a sense of duty or religious obligation, or reﬂect an impulse. In all cases, it constitutes an
improvement of economic welfare.
Economic welfare analysis is a tool for analyzing economic institutions and models.
For example, economic analysis of a trading institution may establish that the institution
yields Pareto eﬃcient outcomes and, therefore, there is no institutional change that will
improve the economic welfare of all participants. Economists view such results as successes
of their theories because the results demonstrate that the economic model of the institution
is “stable”; there are no changes that are mutually agreeable to all participants. Conversely,
models of economic institutions will raise suspicion if there are obvious welfare improving
changes (changes that all individuals would agree to) because the availability of such
changes suggests that the model misses important aspects of the underlying reality.
Economists use the revealed preference of individuals as a welfare criterion because it
is the only criterion that can be integrated with positive economic analysis. For example,
consider the economic analysis of farm subsidies. Economists have found that US farm
subsidies are ineﬃcient, i.e., farm subsidies could be eliminated and farmers could be
compensated in a way that would increase the economic welfare of all US households. The
most interesting aspect of this observation i st h a tf a r m ss u b s i d i e sp e r s i s td e s p i t et h e i r
ineﬃciency. Motivated by this and related observations, economists have examined the
mechanisms (political and economic) that lead to the persistence of ineﬃcient policies.
The example of farm subsidies is typical for the use of welfare analysis in economics.
Normative statements (farm subsidies are ineﬃcient) are used to deﬁne new positive ques-
tions (what makes farm subsidies persist?) that lead to better models of the underlying
institution. Economists use welfare analysis to identify the interests of economic agents
and to ask whether existing policies can be interpreted as an expression of those interests or
30whether the understanding of the institutional constraints on policies remains incomplete.
This use of welfare analysis requires the standard deﬁnition of economic welfare. There
is no reason for economic agents to gravitate towards policies and institutions that yield
higher welfare if the underlying notion of welfare does not reﬂe c tt h ei n t e r e s t so fa g e n t sa s
t h ea g e n t st h e m s e l v e sp e r c e i v et h e s ei n t e r e s t s .
6.2 Neuroeconomic Welfare Analysis
Neuroeconomists treat the economists deﬁnition of welfare as if it were a theory of
happiness and proceed to ﬁnd evidence against this theory. CLP write,
“Economics proceeds on the assumption that satisfying people’s wants is a good thing.
This assumption depends on knowing that people will like what they want. If likes and
wants diverge, this would pose a fundamental challenge to standard welfare economics.
Presumably welfare should be based on ‘liking.’ But if we cannot infer what people like
from what they want and choose, then an alternative method for measuring liking is
needed, while avoiding an oppressive paternalism.” (p. 36)
Welfare in economics is a deﬁnition and not a theory (of happiness). Therefore, the di-
vergence of “liking and wanting” does not pose any challenge to the standard deﬁnition
of welfare, no matter how the former is deﬁned. Standard economics oﬀers no substan-
tive criterion for rationality because it has no therapeutic ambition; it does not attempt
to cure decision-makers who make choices that do not generate the most pleasure. The
more modest economic deﬁnition of welfare is mandated by the role of welfare analysis in
economics.
To compare this role with the role envisaged by neuroeconomists, suppose that a
trading institution is found to be (economically) ineﬃcient. Typically, this will imply that
someone can set up an alternative institution and make a proﬁt. Hence, we can expect this
change to take place without a benevolent dictator, simply as a result of self-interested
entrepreneurship. Suppose a psychologist argues that an ineﬃcient trading institution
leads to higher ‘experienced’ utility than an eﬃcient one and agents are mistaken in their
preference for the economically eﬃcient institution. Whether or not this assertion is true,
the economic analysis of the trading institution is valid. The economically eﬃcient trading
institution is still the one we can expect to prevail. Moreover, since agents perceive their
31own interests to coincide with the economic welfare criterion there is no obvious mechanism
(economic or political) by which the psychologically superior institution could emerge.
N e u r o e c o n o m i s t sw o u l da r g u et h a te v e nt h o u g haw e l f a r ec r i t e r i o nb a s e do nt h ei n -
dividuals own “preferences or desires” may be relevant for positive analysis, a substantive
criterion is needed for normative theory. For neuroeconomists, the goal of welfare analysis
is to advocate changes that improve decision-maker’s well-being. To achieve their goal,
neuroeconomists can either try to convince people to want what is good for them (ther-
apy) or make the right choice on their behalf (paternalism). Kahneman (1994) summarizes
both these positions as follows:
“However, truly informed consent is only possible if patients have a reasonable concep-
tion of expected long-term developments in their hedonic responses,...A more contro-
versial issues arises if we admit that an outsider can sometimes predict an individual’s
future utility far better than the individual can. Does this superior knowledge carry a
warrant, or even a duty, for paternalistic intervention? It appears right for Ulysses’
sailors to tie him to the mast against his will, if they believe that he is deluded about
his ability to resist the fatal call of the sirens.”
The neuroeconomic view of welfare analysis builds on an inappropriate analogy between an
e c o n o m i s ta n dat h e r a p i s t .I tm a yb et h ec a s et h a ts o m e t i m e so u t s i d e r sk n o wm o r ea b o u t
the future utility of an individual than the individual himself. But the goal of economics
is not to prepare the economist for service at times when he ﬁnds himself in the role of
that outsider.
If economists were in the business of invest m e n tc o u n s e l l i n g ,i tm i g h tm a k es e n s ef o r
neuroeconomists to focus on the conﬂict between what the typical consumer/investor wants
to do now and what will make him happy in the future. But economists do not deal with
patients (or even clients). Therefore it is not clear who the recipient of their counselling
would be. The neuroeconomic view of the economist as a therapist is inappropriate both
as a description of what economists do, and as a description of what they could be doing.
Of course, one could argue that economists should identify a substantive criterion
for rationality (i.e., a criterion for measuring what really makes individuals happy) and
advocate changes that increase welfare according to this criterion regardless of whether
32or not they have the means to convince the potential beneﬁciaries to follow this advice.
The hope being that someone other than the potential beneﬁciary might be convinced
to implement the policies. This view is apparent in Kahneman’s search for a benevolent
paternalistic ﬁgure in his examples:
“...the physician could probably ensure that the patient will retain a more favourable
memory of the procedure by adding to it a medically superﬂuous period of diminishing
pain. Of course, the patient would probably reject the physician’s oﬀer to provide an
improved memory at the cost of more actual pain. Should the physician go ahead
anyway, on behalf of the patient’s future remembering self?” (Kahneman (1994))
I nt h es a m ea r t i c l e ,K a h n e man suggests that there is
“a case in favour of some paternalistic interventions, when it is plausible that the state
knows more about an individual’s future tastes than the individual knows presently.”
When economists or political scientists model the government, they do so either by endow-
ing the government with certain objectives or by modeling government as an institution
where conﬂicting incentives of various agents interact. In Kahneman’s analysis, the gov-
ernment is a benign and disinterested agent whose only role is to serve as the object of the
modeler’s lobbying eﬀorts.
Welfare analysis for neuroeconomics is a form of social activism; it is a recommendation
for someone to change his preferences or for someone in a position of authority to intervene
on behalf of someone else. In contrast, welfare economics in the standard economic model
is integrated with the model’s positive analysis; it takes agents’ preferences as given and
evaluates the performance of economic institutions.
Regardless of one’s views on the importance and eﬃcacy of social activism, there are
advantages to separating the role of the economist as a researcher from the role a particular
economist might play as an advocate. This separation enables the positive analysis to
proceed without having to resolve diﬃcult philosophical problems such as ﬁguring out what
m a k e sp e o p l eh a p p yo rw h oi sm o r ed e s e r v i n go fh a p p i n e s s .I ta l s oe n a b l e so t h e rr e s e a r c h e r s
to assess and critique a particular piece of analysis without having to evaluate the merits
of the underlying moral philosophy or the eﬀectiveness of the researcher’s activism.
336.3 Proposals for Paternalistic Welfare Criteria
Two recent articles outline plans for welfare economics based on paternalistic princi-
ples. In both papers, the authors are motivated by evidence showing that the speciﬁcation
of the default option aﬀects individual choices of retirement plans. Rates of enrollment in
401(k) plans are signiﬁcantly higher when the default option is to enroll than when the
default option is not to enroll.
A standard interpretation of the 401(k) problem would argue that the default matters
for the decision problem as perceived by the individual. The employee’s set of feasible
strategies changes with the default just as the feasible strategies of the American tourist
in London change when a sign is placed at the side of the road alerting the tourist to look
right. The welfare maximizing default option is the one that agents would choose when
asked to choose among defaults.
Thaler and Sunstein (2003) (henceforth TS) seek paternalistic principles for choosing
a default option. TS advocate libertarian paternalism and suggest the following three
guiding principles:
“First, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that majority would choose
if explicit choices were required and revealed.”
Hence, the libertarian paternalist is to substitute the predicted preferences of the majority
for the preferences of the individual.
“Second, the libertarian paternalist might select the approach that would force people
to make their choices explicit.” Finally, “the libertarian paternalist might select the
approach that minimizes the number of opt-outs.”
TS oﬀer no arguments for why their principles are likely to lead to greater happiness.
In fact, they oﬀer no defense of these principles. They simply say that the libertarian
paternalist might choose to use them.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eT Sp r i n c i p l e sa r en o tp a r t icularly compelling as moral philosophy
is a side issue. The real issue is that it is diﬃcult to see what question their proposal
addresses. To put it diﬀerently, it is unclear who they have in mind as the potential
beneﬁciary of their philosophical argument. The TS motivation for paternalism seems to
be that it is inevitable:
34“The ﬁrst misconception is that there are viable alternatives to paternalism. In many
situations, some organization or agent must make a choice that will aﬀect the choices
of some other people.”
Clearly, the decisions of one agent may aﬀect the utility of others. Economic analysis
suggests that the interests of the agent in control are a good place to start when analyzing
such situations. For example, in order to maximize proﬁts, ﬁrms may wish to make their
beneﬁt plans as attractive as possible to their future employees. In that case, ﬁrms will
choose plans (and their default options) in accordance with how the employees would
choose them. It may be impractical to ask prospective employees about their preferred
default option on the retirement plan and therefore the ﬁrm will use its best subjective
assessment of the employees preferences.
Of course, the employer may have diﬀerent objectives and may choose a plan that
diﬀe r sf r o mh i sb e s tg u e s so ft h ee m p l o y e e sp referred plan. Presumably, he would do
so to increase his own welfare. In this situation, as in the situation of the pure proﬁt
maximizing employer, it is unlikely that there is any role for the TS principles. The
TS argument amounts to telling employers that when they face incomplete information
they should adopt a diﬀerent objective. Standard economics would predict that employers
will take the best action given their own objectives and given what they know about the
preferences of the employees.
In a recent paper, Camerer, Issacharoﬀ, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003,
henceforth CILOR) introduce and advocate the notion of “asymmetric paternalism:”
“A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large beneﬁts for those who
make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.”
CILOR do not explain which preferences reﬂect bounded rationality and which reﬂect full
rationality, when beneﬁts are large and when there is little or no harm. Nevertheless,
their implicit welfare criterion is familiar. As w ed e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n5 . 2 ,t h em i s t a k e so f
boundedly rational agents can be modeled as a subjective informational constraint facing
these agents. With this re-interpretation, the CILOR principle amounts to an (epsilon)
version of the Pareto principle: help the uninformed without hurting the informed (too
much). However, there is an important diﬀerence between the CILOR version of the Pareto
35principle and the Pareto principle in standard economics: CILOR view their principle as
a framework for activism. They urge their readers to adopt their modiﬁed libertarian
philosophy in place of the purely libertarian philosophy that they perceive as guiding
many economists (and perhaps some lawyers) or the unabashed paternalism favored by
behavioral economists.
“Our paper seeks to engage two diﬀerent audiences with two diﬀe r e n ts e t so fc o n c e r n s :
For those (particularly economists) prone to rigid antipaternalism, the paper describes
a possibly attractive rationale for paternalism as well as a careful, cautious, and dis-
ciplined approach. For those prone to give unabashed support for paternalistic policies
based on behavioral economics, this paper argues that more discipline is needed and
proposes a possible criterion” (CILOR p. 1212).
Of course, it is legitimate for TS and CILOR to engage employers or the legal and economics
professions in a moral debate. But this has little to do with welfare economics which is not
concerned with moral philosophy or with providing a disciplined guide for social action.
Standard economists spend little time or eﬀort advocating normative criteria even
when they feel that the right normative criterion is unambiguous. For example, many
economists and decision-theorists believe in the importance of making decisions under un-
certainty consistent with some subjective probability assessments. Moreover, hardly any-
one would question the normative appeal of using Bayes’ law when updating probabilities.
There are many research papers where agents are endowed with subjective probabilities
and use Bayes law. The purpose of these papers is not to advocate the use of subjective
probabilities or Bayesian revision; rather, the normative appeal of the Savage model serves
as a starting point for the positive analysis. The ultimate value of Savage’s contribution
depends not on the ability of his followers to convince individual economic agents or benign
planners to adopt his view of probability but on the success his followers have at developing
models that address economic data.
6.4 Preference Reversals and Multiselves
There is evidence that individuals resolve the same intertemporal trade-oﬀ diﬀerently
depending on when the decision is made.15 Researchers, starting with the work of Strotz
15 See Loewenstein, et al. for a recent survey of the experimental evidence. In the typical experiment,
subjects choose between a smaller, date 2 reward and a larger, date 3 reward. If the choice is made at
date 2, then the smaller-earlier reward is chosen. If the choice is made earlier (i.e., at date 1) then the
larger-later reward is chosen. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as dynamic inconsistency or a
preference reversal.
36(1955), have argued that this phenomenon requires modeling the individual as a collection
of distinct selves with conﬂicting interests. Such models represent a major departure from
standard economics conception of the individual as the unit of agency. For example, if the
individual cannot be identiﬁed as a coherent set of interests, then the economists’ welfare
criterion is not well-deﬁned. Hence, for neuroeconomists, preference reversals constitute
an empirical validation of the psychologist’s — as opposed to the economist’s — view of the
individual.
Consider the following example: in period 1, the agent chooses the consumption stream
(0,0,9) over (1,0,0) and chooses (1,0,0) over (0,3,0 ) .I np e r i od2t h ea g e n tc h oo s e s( 0 ,3,0)
over (0,0,9). Suppose the agent faces the following decision problem: he can either choose
(1,0,0) in period 1 or leave the choice between (0,0,9) and (0,3,0) for period 2. Confronted
with this choice, the agent picks (1,0,0).
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), (2004) and (2005), we propose a standard, single-self
model that accounts for this behavior. To illustrate the approach, deﬁne C to be the set of
second period choice problems for the individual; that is, an element C ∈ C consists of con-




C ∈ C implies c1 = c0
1. In period 2, the individual chooses a consumption stream from
some C. In period 1, the individual chooses a choice problem C for period 2. Choosing
(1,0,0) in period 1 corresponds to {(1,0,0)} while the option of leaving it to period 2 to
choose between (0,3,0) and (0,0,9) is described as
C = {(0,3,0),(0,0,9)}
With this notation, we can summarize the (period 1) behavior as
{(0,0,9)}Â{ (1,0,0)}ÂC = {(0,3,0),(0,0,9)} ∼ {(0,3,0)}
Note that choosing between {(0,3,0)} and {(0,0,9)} is not the same as choosing from the
set C = {(0,3,0),(0,0,9)}. In the former case, the consumer commits t oac o n s u m p t i o n
path in period 1 while in the latter he chooses in period 2. The preference statements
above indicate that the individual prefers a situation where he is committed to (0,0,1) to
37as i t u a t i o nw h e r eh ec h o o s e sf r o mC in period 2. When such a commitment is unavailable,
and the agent is confronted with C in period 2, he chooses (0,3,0).
Standard economic models identify choice with welfare. Therefore, the choice of
(0,3,0) from C in period 2 is welfare maximizing as is the choice of {(0,0,9)} over {(0,3,0)}
in period 1. The interpretation is that, in period 2, the agent struggles with the temptation
to consume 3 units. Temptation is costly to resist and therefore consuming (rather than
holding out for 9 in period 3) is the optimal (and welfare maximizing) choice in period 2.
In period 1, higher period 2 consumption is not tempting and therefore the agent prefers
{(0,0,9)} over {(0,3,0)}. Period 1 behavior reveals that the individual’s welfare is higher
in all periods when he is committed to (0,0,9) than when he must choose from C in period
2.16
The multi-self model abandons the revealed preference approach to welfare and con-
structs paternalistic welfare criteria. Consi d e ra g a i nt h et h r e ep e r i o dm o d e l .I ne a c hp e -
riod, the individual’s preference are described by a utility function, Ut. For concreteness,
assume:
U1(c1,c 2,c 3)=c1 + βδc2 + βδ2c3
U2(c1,c 2,c 3)=c2 + βδc3
U3(c1,c 2,c 3)=δc3
(9)
where δ = β =1 /2. While diﬀerent papers postulate diﬀerent welfare criteria for such
situations, the common argument is that preference reversals necessitate a criterion for
trading-oﬀ the utility of the various selves. The most common practice in this literature
is to treat the U0 below as the welfare criterion.
U0(c1,c 2,c 3)=c1 + δc2 + δ2c3
This particular welfare criterion may seem odd. After all, U0 quite arbitrarily sets β =1
and assigns a higher welfare to (1,0,11) than to (2,3,0) even though selves 1 and 2 prefer
(2,3,0). The multiple-selves literature interprets U0 as the preferences with the“present
16 Note that choosing between {(0,0,9)} and C is not a feasible option in period 2. Therefore, revealed
preference experiments cannot uncover whether or not in period 2, the individual has a preference (or
distaste) for commitment.
38bias” removed.17 In other words, β<1 is diagnosed as a defect and the role of policy
intervention is to cure this defect.
Note that hyperbolic discounting (or time inconsistency) is not necessary for gener-
ating conﬂict among the various selves of the individual: Consider again the three pe-
riod example above but now let β = 1. The resulting utility functions describe stan-
dard preferences with exponential discounting. Consider the two consumption streams:
(1,0,0) and (0,0,4) and note that U1(1,0,0) = U1(0,0,4) but U2(1,0,0) <U 2(0,0,4) and
U3(1,0,0) <U 3(0,0,4); that is, the allocation (1,0,0) is Pareto dominated by the allo-
cation (0,0,4) even though the usual welfare criterion of the multiselves literature (U0)
would deem the two alternatives welfare equivalent.18
Economists often note the arbitrariness of using U0 as a welfare criterion in the mul-
tiselves model. It is not clear what hedonic utility calculations have led neuroeconomists
to decide that U0 represents the right trade-oﬀ among the hedonic utilities of the various
selves. Our point is diﬀerent: standard economics has neither need nor use for a wel-
fare criterion that trades oﬀ utility among the various selves of a single individual. Such
trade-oﬀs can never play a role in explaining or understanding economic institutions. By
deﬁnition, only behavior can inﬂuence economic data or institutions. Hence, beyond their
eﬀect on behavior the various ‘selves’ are irrelevant for the analysis. By contrast, neu-
roeconomists view the existence of multiple selves as both an opportunity and a rationale
for activism. They wish to urge the individual to do a better job at accommodating the
welfare of their future selves (i.e., resist β<1 and other biases). Failing that, they would
like to convince third parties to intervene on behalf of the agent’s future selves. This ther-
apeutic/paternalistic stance is similar to the position of medical professionals who attempt
to cure a patient’s addiction. By proposing a welfare criterion, the modeler is either urging
the individual to reform his behavior, or urging someone in a position of authority to force
t h ei n d i v i d u a lt od os o .
Identifying what makes people happy, deﬁning criteria for trading-oﬀ one person’s
(or selves) happiness against the happiness of another, and advocating social change in a
17 See, for example, Rabin and O’Donoghue (2003).
18 In standard analysis, this issue does not arise because the same utility function (U1)i su s e dt o
describe behavior (and welfare) at each decision date. In period 2, period 1 consumption cannot be altered
and therefore the additively separable form of the utility function allows us to drop the ﬁrst term as a
simpliﬁcation without aﬀecting optimal choices.
39manner that advances overall happiness by this criterion is a task many neuroeconomists
ﬁnd more worthy than dealing with the more pedestrian questions of standard economics.
However, the expression of this preference constitutes neither an empirical nor a method-
ological criticism of standard economics.
7. The Uniﬁcation of Economics and Neuroscience
Neuroeconomists often cite improvements in neuroscience, in particular, improvements
in measurements, as a central reason for unifying the disciplines of economics, psychology,
and brain science:
“Since feelings were meant to predict behavior, but could only be assessed from behav-
ior, economists realized that without direct measurement, feelings were useless inter-
vening constructs. In the 1940s, the concepts of ordinal utility and revealed preference
eliminated the superﬂuous intermediate step of positing immeasurable feelings. Re-
vealed preference theory simply equates unobserved preferences with observed choices.
Circularity is avoided by assuming that people behave consistently, which makes the
theory falsiﬁable; once they have revealed that they prefer A to B, people should not
subsequently choose B over A...... The ‘as if’ approach made good sense, as long as
the brain remained substantially a black box. The development of economics could not
be held hostage to progress in other human sciences. But now neuroscience has proved
Jevons’ pessimistic prediction wrong; the study of the brain and nervous system is
beginning to allow direct measurement of thoughts and feelings.” (CLP (2005), p. 10).
Elsewhere, Camerer notes,
“[t]his ‘rational choice’ approach has been enormously successful. But now advances
in genetics and brain imaging (and other techniques) have made it possible to observe
detailed processes in the brain better than ever before. Brain scanning (ongoing at
the new Broad Imaging Center at Caltech) shows which parts of the brain are active
when people make economic decisions. This means that we will eventually be able to
replace the simple mathematical ideas that have been used in economics with more
neurally-detailed descriptions.” Camerer (2005).
40Thus, neuroeconomists view the revealed preference approach to be an outdated concession
to technological limitations of the past.19 Since the technology for distinguishing between
“liking” (i.e., a criterion of substantive rationality) and “wanting” (i.e., choice) may soon
be available, economics (and presumably other social sciences) should abandon the revealed
preference methodology and adopt the methodology of psychology and neuroscience.
The dominant role of revealed preference analysis in economics has little to do with
technology. Economic phenomena consist of individual choices and their aggregates and
do not include hedonic values of utilities or feelings. Therefore, it is not relevant for an
economic model to explore the feelings associated with economic choices. The point of
revealed preference theory is to separate the theory of decision making from the analysis
of emotional consequences of decisions. This separation is useful whether or not emotions
can be measured simply because it facilitates specialization. Note that the more detailed
and sophisticated the measurement the greater is the potential beneﬁt of specialization.
Brain imaging data are of a radically diﬀerent form than typical economic data. If
the prediction of great advances in brain science turn out to be correct, they will certainly
be accompanied by theoretical advances that address the particular data in that ﬁeld. It
is unreasonable to require those theories to be successful at addressing economic data as
well. By the same token, the requirement that economic theories simultaneously account
for economic data and brain imaging data places an unreasonable burden on economic
theories.
Note that the above does not say that psychological factors are irrelevant for economic
decision making, nor does it say that economists should ignore psychological insights.
Economists routinely take their inspiration from psychological data or theories. However,
economic models are evaluated by their success at explaining economic phenomena. Since
hedonic utility values or brain imaging data are not economic phenomena, economists
should not feel constrained to choose models that succeed as models of the brain.
The arguments advanced by neuroeconomists in favor of uniﬁcation often fail to dis-
tinguish between a novel philosophical position and a scientiﬁc breakthrough. Often, what
19 For Kahneman, the rejection of hedonic utility as the basis for economic analysis of decisions has less
to do with technology than the adherence to an outdated philosophy of science. Rabin (1996) seems to view
a doctrinaire obstinacy as the only explanation for the persistence of economists’ “habitual” assumptions.
41neuroeconomists present as an empirical chal l e n g et oe c o n o m i c si sb e s tv i e w e da sa ni n v i -
tation to an ethical debate. For example, Kahneman (1994) writes:
“The history of an individual through time can be described as a succession of separate
selves... Which one of these selves should be granted authority over outcomes in the
future?”
Hence, neuroeconomics interprets the individual as a ﬂawed and inconsistent sequence of
“pleasure machines,” that need therapeutic and paternalistic assistance for assessing the
right intertemporal trade-oﬀs and making the right choices.
It is not clear what evidence neuroeconomics can oﬀer to answer questions like “should
physicians increase the actual pain experienced by the patient in order to facilitate his
memory and improve his decision making for the future?” (Kahneman (1994)). What is
clear is that ﬁnding out how to trade-oﬀ the welfare of one self against another or deciding
“[w]hich one of these selves should be granted authority over outcomes in the future,” is
n o ta ne c o n o m i cp r o b l e m .
CLP (2004) suggest a more modest goal: that neuroscience may facilitate direct mea-
surement of preference parameters by “asking the brain, not the person,” (p. 573). The
authors have no example of observing a choice parameter — such as the coeﬃcient of rel-
ative risk aversion or the discount factor — through brain imaging, no suggestions as to
how such inference could be done. They oﬀer no criteria for distinguishing a brain where
δ = .97 versus one where δ = .7. They do not explain what language to use when ‘asking
the brain, rather than the person,’ which language the brain will use to respond, or what
to do when the brain’s answer conﬂicts with the answer of the person.
In the end, scientiﬁc developments play a small role in the arguments of neuroe-
conomists: when it comes to substantiating the central philosophical position that there is
ad i ﬀerence between what people want and what is good for them, subjective readings of
the facial expressions of mice do just as well as anything that might be learned from fMRI
readings.
428. Conclusion: Why the Neuroeconomics Critique Fails
Kahneman (1994) notes the following two problems facing “a critic of the rationality
assumption”:
“...(ii) a willingness of choice theorists to make the theory even more permissive, as
needed to accommodate apparent violations of its requirements; (iii) a methodological
position that treats rationality as a maintained hypothesis making it very diﬃcult to
disprove....”
Kahneman’s observations make it clear that rationality is not an assumption in economics
but a methodological stance. This stance reﬂects economists’ decision to view the indi-
vidual as the unit of agency and investigate the interaction of the purposeful behaviors of
diﬀerent individuals within various economic institutions. One can question the usefulness
of this methodological stance by challenging individual economic models or the combined
output of economics but one cannot disprove it.
The diﬃculties that Kahneman observes for critics of the rationality assumption are
no diﬀerent than the diﬃculties that one would encounter when challenging the assump-
tion that laboratory experiments on individual choice are useful for understanding real-life
behavior. For example, a critic of such experiments may complain that real-life choice
problems do not come with explicit probabilities. If successful, such a criticism will lead
to a new class of experiments, ones that do not make explicit references to probabili-
ties.20 However, a critic cannot expect to disprove the usefulness of experimental methods
for understanding choice behavior. Criticisms that aim to disprove a broad and ﬂexible
methodology as if it were a single falsiﬁable assumption are best viewed as demands for
a shift in emphasis from questions that the critic considers uninteresting to ones that he
ﬁn d sm o r ei n t e r e s t i n g .
This latter description ﬁts our view of what CLP (2005), Rabin (1998), and Kahneman
(1994) describe as the radical challenge to economics:
“The radical approach involves turning back the hands of time and asking how eco-
nomics might have evolved diﬀerently if it had been informed from the start by insights
20 Compare for example, earlier experiments on the Allais’ Paradox and the common ratio eﬀect with
later experiments on framing and reference points.
43and ﬁndings now available from neuroscience. Neuroscience, we will argue, points to
an entirely new set of constructs to underlie economic decision making. The standard
economic theory of constrained utility maximization is most naturally interpreted ei-
ther as the result of learning based on consumption experiences (which is of little help
when prices, income and opportunity sets change), or careful deliberation- a balancing
of the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent options — as might characterize complex decisions
like planning for retirement, buying a house, or hammering out a contract. Although
economists may privately acknowledge that actual ﬂesh-and-blood human beings often
choose without much deliberation, the economic models as written invariably represent
decisions in a ‘deliberative equilibrium,’ ...” (CLP (2005), p. 10).
Populating economic models with “ﬂesh-and-blood human beings,” was never the objective
of economists. Constrained optimization, Bayes law, and other economic abstractions do
not represent the state-of-the art psychology of an earlier era. Therefore, there is no reason
to believe that making the state-of-the art psychology of our time available earlier would
have had such a profound eﬀect on the development of economics.
Rabin (1998) argues that
“it is sometimes misleading to conceptualize people as attempting to maximize a co-
herent, stable, and accurately perceived U(x).”
Economists have at their disposal numerous devices to incorporate instability (or change)
into individual preferences. They can assume that the decision-maker’s preferences de-
pend on an exogenous state variable, on the information of his opponents, or his own
consumption history. The decision-maker may be learning about a relevant preference pa-
rameter, over time. All this ﬂexibility or permissiveness notwithstanding, it is likely that
the economists’ model of the individual is not suitable for psychologists’ goals. It does not
follow from this that economists should adopt both the goals and methods of psychology.
Regardless of the source of their inspiration, economic models can only be evaluated
on their own terms, with respect to their own objectives and evidence. A revolution in eco-
nomics has to yield great economic insights. The CLP and Rabin agendas seem far reach-
ing only because they deﬁne the task of economics as continually importing psychology-
neuroscience ideas. Both papers oﬀer very little in the way of novel economic analysis
44or implications. Rabin observes that “...fairness and reference-level eﬀects (reviewed in
Section 2) and framing eﬀects (reviewed in Section 4) are likely to contribute to downward
stickiness in wages” but leaves “it for other forums to explore these implications.” Simi-
larly, all the challenges CLP (2005) identify for the emerging discipline of neuroeconomics
resemble the current questions of psychology more than the current questions of economics.
A choice theory paper in economics must identify the revealed preference implications
of the model presented and describe how revealed preference methods can be used to iden-
tify its parameters. Revealed preference earnss u c hac e n t r a lr o l ei ne c o n o m i c sb e c a u s et h i s
i st h ef o r mo fe v i d e n c et h a ti sa v a i l a b l et oe c o n o m i s t s-a n dn o tb e c a u s eo fap h i l o s o p h i c a l
stance against other forms of evidence.
Greater psychological realism is not an appropriate modeling criterion for economics
and therapeutic social activism is not its goal. Welfare analysis helps economists under-
stand how things are by comparing the existing situation to how things might have been
in a plausible alternative institutional setting; welfare theory is not a blueprint for a social
movement.
We may be sceptical of neuroscientists’ ability to come up with a universal, physio-
logically grounded criteria for measuring happiness. We may also have doubts about the
potential eﬀectiveness of neuroeconomists at convincing individuals or society as a whole,
to adopt policies that increase “total happiness” by their measure. Our response to the
neuroeconomics welfare theory is simpler: such a combination of moral philosophy and
activism has never been the goal of economics; grounding this combination in biology is
unlikely to make it so.
459. Appendix
Proof of the Proposition
First, we will show that (i) implies (ii): Suppose c is a general K¨ oszegi-Rabin choice
function. Then, there exists a reference dependent utility function U such that c = C(·,U).
Deﬁne º as follows: x º y if U(x,x) ≥ U(y,x). Then, for all A ∈ Y ,
c(A)=C(A,U)={x ∈ A|U(x,x) ≥ U(y,x)} = {x ∈ A|x º y} = Cº(A)
as desired.
To prove that (ii) implies (iii), assume that c = Cº and let n be the cardinality of X.R e c a l l
that º is a complete, reﬂexive, binary relation. We write x Â y for x º y and y 6º x.L e t






3i f x = w = z
2i f x = w and w Â z
−2i f x = z and w Â z
0o t h e r w i s e .
Deﬁne the function µ as follows:
µ(t)=
½
16nt if t ∈ {−4,−3,4}
t if t ∈ {−2,0,2,3}








To complete the proof, we will show that Cº = C(·,U); that is x º y iﬀ U(x,x) ≥ U(y,x)
for all x,y ∈ X,a n d





uk(x) ≥− 2n (∗)
46Let Kx,y = K\{(y,y),(x,x),(x,y),(y,x)} a n dn o t et h a tf o rk ∈ Kx,y
2 ≥ uk(x) − uk(y) ≥− 2( ∗∗)




(uk(x) − uk(y)) =
X
Kx,y
µ(uk(x) − uk(y)) ≥− 4n
Let x º y.N o t et h a tµ(u(x,y)(y)−u(x,y)(x)) ≤ 0a n d ,s i n c ex º y,w ea l s oh a v eµ(u(y,x)(y)−












− µ(u(x,x)(y) − u(x,x)(x)) − µ(u(y,y)(y) − u(y,y)(x))
≥−8n +4 8 n − 3 > 0












µ(uk(y) − uk(x)) − µ(u(x,x)(y) − u(x,x)(x))
− µ(u(y,y)(y) − u(y,y)(x)) − µ(u(y,x)(y) − u(y,x)(x))
≤ 8n − 3+4 8 n − 64n<0
Finally, suppose U(x,y) − U(y,y) ≥ 0. Then,




[µ(uk(y) − uk(x)) + µ(uk(x) − uk(y))]
= −2(µ(−3) + µ(3)) = 2(48n − 3) > 0
completing the proof that (ii) implies (iii). That (iii) implies (i) is immediate.
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